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Abstract 
In the two-echelon supply-chain literature, the manufacturer-Stackelberg process, i.e. the manufacturer is a 
Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a Stackelberg follower, is one of the most common gaming assumptions. In 
which, the optimal prices and optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer should be affected by the shape of 
the demand curve. In this paper, we discuss the influence to the optimal prices and profits by changing the parameters 
in demand curve, and analyze the stability of the optimal prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. By 
using the Lipschitz properties of the optimal price-functions and profit-functions on the parameters of the demand 
curve, we find that there are sizable distinction in the stability of the optimal prices and profits of the manufacturer 
and the retailer with different demand curves. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of  ICAE2011 
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1. Introduction
The relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer has been investigated by many researchers.
The increasing attention to supply chains leads to more studies on mulitiple-echelon systems [1-5]. 
In the two-echelon supply-chain literature, the manufacturer-Stackelberg process (abbreviated as m-St),
i.e. the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a Stackelberg follower, is one of the most 
common gaming assumptions. 
In this paper, we will discuss how the changing of parameters in a demand curve affects the optimal 
prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. And farther, we analyze the stability of the optimal 
solutions in the two-echelon supply-chain process. 
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2. Preparation knowledge 
In this section, some symbols and background materials on the stability in mathematical programming 
and Lipschitz property of functions are given. 
2.1.  Basic definitions 
In this section, some symbols are given for convenience, and the form of these symbols according to 
Lau-Lau [3]. 
Nomenclature
  Profit.   may have two subscripted letters and two superscripted letters, e.g., . ’s two-][mSlR 
lettered superscript “ ” designates for m-St process. ][mS  ’s first subscripted letter denotes the demand-
curve form; it will be either l  for “linear”,  for “iso-elastic” or  for “exponen-tial”. ’s second c e 
subscripted letter will be either M  for manufacture, or  for retailer.  R
c  unit manufacturing cost incurred by the manufacturer. 
w  unit wholesale price charged to the retailer by the manufacturer. 
p  unit retail price the retailer charges the consumers. 
pD  demand function of . And ’s second subscript denotes different type of the demand p pD
function, e.g., . plD
There are three kinds of demand functions considered in this paper: 
 First kind is the linear demand curve bpaD pl  , where a  and b  are positive parameters, pba  . 
 Second kind is the iso-elastic curve  Kppl , where K  and   are positive parameters, 1 . D
 Third kind is the exponential curve pe , where plD     and   are positive parameters. 
In this paper, we consider the case of one manufacturer selling to one retailer, so their profit functions 
without logistic cost components are, respectively: 
pM Dcw )(  , pR Dwp )(                                                                                                   (1) 
So the mathematical model of the m-St process can be described as a bilevel programming problem as 
follows: 



 
 pppw
DwppDcw )(maxarg:)(max
00
                                                                                       (2) 
2.2. Preparation knowledge 
In this section, some background material on the stability in mathematical programming and Lipschitz 
property of functions which will be used later. We give only concise definitions and facts that will be 
needed in the paper, and there are more detailed information in [6-8]. 
For the parameter programming problem 
 mn TttSxtxf  ,)(:),(max
* *
                                                                                        (3) 
We denote ,  as the optimal region and the optimal value of problem (3), where t tR f t  is a parameter. 
Then we have some definitions on the stability of problem (3). 
Definition 1 Problem (3) is called weak stable on parameter Tt 0 , if  
1) , *
0t
R
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2) 0 , 0 , when  0tt  for Tt , there is  )()( 0tftf . 
Definition 2 Problem (3) is called strong stable on parameter Tt 0 , if  
1) problem (3) is weak stable on parameter Tt 0 , 
2) for all which satisfyTt  0tt , there are and , where  ][ ** 0tt RR  ][ **0 tt RR   SxProposition 1 If there is only one element in  for all parameter  yxyS :][ . *tR Tt , the weak stability is 
equivalent to the strong stability for problem (3). 
Definition 3 Function  is called Lipschitz in , if there exist a constant , 
for any , there is 
1:)( nxf nI  1L
Ixx 21, 2121 )()( xxLxfxf  . 
Proposition 2 If a smooth function  has limitary differential coefficient in )(xf I , then it is Lipschitz 
in I . 
3. Stability analysis in the M-St process 
For the retailer is a Stackelberg follower in problem (2), so we can solve the retailer's optimal retail 
price firstly with parameter w , and then introduce  into the manufacturer’s decision, we will 
get the optimal wholesale price , and the optimal profits  and . 
*][mSp *][mSp
*][mSw *][mSM *][mSR
For the special structure in problem (2), we get that the optimal solutions and values in which will be 
primary functions of parameters in the demand curve. Thereby, the stability of problem (2) can translate 
into the Lipschitz property of the objective function. 
In this section, the main works are to analyze the stabilities of the optimal prices and profits in the m-St 
press, with the three kinds of demand curves mentioned in Section 2. 
3.1. Linear demand curve 
Lau-Lau [2] give the optimal prices and profits in the m-St press with linear demand curve as follows: 
 
b
bca
w mS
2
*][  ,
b
bca
p mS
4
3*][  ,
b
bcamS
M 8
2
*][  ,
b
bcamS
R 16
2
*][  , 2*][
*][


mS
R
mS
M .              (4) 
First, we consider the influence of parameter a  in the optimal prices and profits. 
Theorem 1 The optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer in m-St process are stable to 
demand curve parameter  in a linear demand curve. a
Proof: For any given parameter , the optimal prices  and  are both linear functions 
of parameter  with constant slopes: 
0b *][mSw *][mSp
a
 
ba
w
2
1
 mS *][
,
ba
p
4
3
 mS *][
.                                                                                                            (5) 
So according to Definition 2, we know that  and  are Lipschitz smooth functions on 
. 
*][mSw *][mSp
),0( a
Then it illuminates that the optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer are stable to demand 
curve parameter .                                                                                                                                        □ a
And Theorem 1 means that, if the linear demand curve just budges without changing the shape, the 
optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer will only change tiny corresponding. 
Theorem 2 The stability of the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in m-St process to 
parameter a  weaken in a linear demand curve while a  augments to  . 
Proof: Since  and bac /
 
0
4


b
bca
a
M
*][mS
, 0
8

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b
bca
a
R
*][mS
.                                                                                    (6) 
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Then  and  are strictly monotone increasable smooth functions of parameter a . Moreover, *][mSM *][mSR


a
M
mS *][
, 

a
R
mS *][
, when a .                                                                             (7) 
 
Hereby,  and  are not Lipschitz functions on *][mSM *][mSR ),0( a , but are Lipschitz smooth 
functions on  for arbitrary positive number ), A0(a A . 
So the optimal profits in m-St process are stable to demand curve parameter  while  is far from 
.                                                                                                                                                                □ 
a a

From the above two theorems, we can find that, to the same change in parameter a , there are quite 
different appearances in the corresponding change in the optimal prices and profits. The reason is that the 
same change of parameter a  at different values will lead to different changes in the optimal output, and 
the optimal profits will be influenced. 
And then we consider the influence of parameter b  in the optimal prices and profits similarly. 
Theorem 3 The optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer in m-St process are stable on 
parameter b  in a linear demand curve, as long as b  is not close to 0. 
Proof: For any given parameter , there are 0a
0
2 2


b
a
b
w *][mS
, 0
4
3
2


b
a
b
p *][mS
.                                                                                           (8) 
So and  are strictly monotone decreasing smooth functions of parameter . And *][mSw *][mSp b
0
*][


b
w mS
, 0

b
p *][mS b, when ; 

b
w mS *][
, 

b
p *][mS  0, when b .        (9) 
So and are non-differential at*][mSw *][mSp 0b and Lipschitz functions on ),[ 1  Bb  for arbitrary 
positive number . 1
Therefore the optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer are stable on parameter , as long as 
 is not close to 0.                                                                                                                                         □ 
B
b
b
And the above fact in Theorem 3 can be illuminated by the price elasticity theory. From the definition 
of price elasticity coefficient  of the demand curve, we know that DE
bpa
bp
E
plD 
 .                                                                                                                                (10) 
And when b  tend to 0, 
plD
 will become smaller and the shape of demand curve will become more 
cliffier, then the sensitivity of the optimal price to parameter  is higher, shown as Fig 1. 
E
b
 
Fig. 1. the linear demand curve 
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Similarly to Theorem 3, we have 
Theorem 4 The optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in m-St process are stable on 
parameter b  in a linear demand curve, as long as b  is not close to 0. 
Proof: Since 
0
8
))((
2
*][


b
bcabca
b
mS
M , 0
16
))((
2
*][


b
bcabca
a
mS
R .                                               (11) 
 
Then and  are strictly monotone descending smooth functions of parameter b .  *][mSM *][mSR
However there are 
 


b
M
mS *][
, 

b
R
mS *][
 0, when b ;
8
c
b
M 

,
2*][mS
16
c
b
R 
 2*][mS , when b .       (12) 
 
So the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are stable on parameter , as long as b  is 
not close to 0.   
b
3.2. Iso-elastic demand curve 
The optimal prices and profits in the m-St press with iso-elastic demand curve are 
1
*][
 w
mS c ,
2
2
*][
)1(  
 c
p mS ,
)1(
)1(
2
12
*][

 

c
KmS
M

,
)1(
)1(
12
)1(2
*][

  

 c
KmS
R

.                          (13) 
 
And the analyses of the curve parameters in an iso-elastic demand curve are studied as follows. 
Theorem 5 The optimal prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are stable to demand 
curve parameter K  in an iso-elastic demand curve. 
Proof: For any given parameter 1 , there are 
0


K
p
K
w *][*][ mSmS
.                                                                                                                     (14) 
 
So there are no change in  and  when parameter *][mSw *][mSp K  has some alteration. And since 
)1(
)1(
2 




 cK
M
12*][ mS
,
)1(
)1(
12
)1(2



 

 cK
R
*][ mS
.                                                                         (15) 
 
So the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are stable to demand curve parameter K . 
And now we discuss the influence of parameter . 
Theorem 6 The optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer in m-St process are stable on 
parameter   in an iso-elastic demand curve, as long as   is not close to 1. 
Proof: First, for 
0
)1( 2




cw *][mS
, 0
)1(
2
3






cp *][mS
.                                                                             (16) 
 
So and  are strictly monotone decreasing smooth functions of parameter *][mSw *][mSp  . And 
0
*][



mSw
, 0


p *][mS , when  ; 


*][mSw
, 


p *][mS 1, when .     (17) 
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So the optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer are unstable to parameter  , when   is 
close to 1, and  and  are non-differential at *][mSw *][mSp 1 . 
Therefore 0 ,  and are Lipschitz smooth functions for *][mSw *][mSp ),1[   , and they are 
stable to   in this region.                                                                                                                              □ 
Theorem 7 The optimal profit of the manufacturer is stable to parameter   in an iso-elastic demand 
curve, however the optimal profit of the retailer is unstable to parameter   when   approaches to 1. 
Proof: For 
 
0
]ln)1ln(2[)1(
12
1
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
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Then  is strictly monotone increasing smooth functions of parameter *][mSM 1 . And 
1

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M
*][mS
1, when ; 0


M
*][mS
, when  .                                                       (19) 
Thereby, the optimal profit of the manufacturer is stable to parameter  . Whereas, since 
0
]ln)1ln(2[)1(
112
1
1*][

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Then  is strictly monotone decreasing smooth functions of parameter *][mSP 1 . And 



P
*][mS
1, when ; 0


P
*][mS
, when  .                                                   (21) 
Thereby, the optimal profit of the retailer is unstable to parameter   when   approaches to 1.  
3.3. Exponential demand curve 
The optimal prices and profits in the m-St press with exponential demand curve are 

 1*][  cw mS , 
 2*][  cp mS , 
mS
R
mS
M
e *][*][
p
.                                                             (22) 
First for the optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer are independent of the value of 
parameter  , and 



peM 
 mS *][
                                                                                                                           (23)
is a constant to  , so the influence of parameter   to the optimal profits and prices is very small. 
Theorem 8 The optimal profits and prices of the manufacturer and the retailer are unstable to 
parameter   in an exponential demand curve when   approaches to 0. 
Proof: There are 
2
*][ 1


 mSw
,
2
2


p *][mS
.                                                                                                       (24) 
And 
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Then the optimal prices of the manufacturer and the retailer are unstable to parameter  , when   is 
close to 0. 
Further, for 
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*][*][
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And 
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

M
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, when  .                                                   (27) 
Then the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are unstable to parameter   when   
approaches to 0.                                                                                                                                              □ 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we discuss the influence to the optimal prices and profits by changing the parameters in 
three different demand curves in the manufacturer-Stackelberg process of two-echelon supply-chain. And 
we find that there are sizable distinction in the stability of the optimal prices and profits of the 
manufacturer and the retailer with different demand curves. 
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